ON 26 NOVEMBER 2025, soldiers in uniform declared “total control” over the government of Guinea-Bissau, suspending the electoral process, sealing borders, and suspending media — just days after presidential and legislative elections. Gunfire erupted near the presidential palace and the headquarters of the electoral commission, forcing the suspension of vote counting. The new military junta announced the formation of a “High Military Command for the Restoration of Order.”
This dramatic takeover re-opens long-familiar wounds: though Guinea-Bissau has held repeated elections, its democracy remains haunted by institutional fragility — and the military continues to view itself as guardian and arbiter of power.
The chronic inability of civilian governments to deliver basic services – healthcare, education, infrastructure, jobs – erodes public trust. In a country ranked very low on human development indices, many citizens suffer from poverty, low social mobility, and limited access to justice or economic opportunities.
Guinea-Bissau’s democratic journey has rarely strayed far from turbulence. Since independence from Portugal in 1974, the country has witnessed four successful coups and more than a dozen failed or attempted ones.
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The political system is deeply fragmented. Political parties come and go; coalitions collapse almost as soon as they form. Executive-legislature stand offs, dissolutions of parliament, and repeated dissolutions of governments are common. In recent years under Umaro Sissoco Embaló, for example, the legislature was dissolved twice (2022, 2023), producing prolonged periods without a functioning parliament.
When civilian institutions are weak or repeatedly dismantled, governance becomes personalised – and public trust erodes. For ordinary citizens, democracy becomes a rhetorical exercise rather than a mechanism to deliver services, security, or economic opportunity.
In a functioning democracy, the armed forces are subordinate to civilian authority. But in Guinea-Bissau, that division seldom holds. Many senior officers today have roots in the liberation struggle and long-standing influence. Over decades, the military has come to see itself as “the only entity capable of enforcing order at times of crisis.”
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As such, coups have become, repeatedly, the default “reset button” when political stalemate, corruption, popular anger, or elite division threaten stability. The November 26 takeover is but the latest example: just days after simultaneous presidential and legislative elections in which both top contenders claimed victory, the military stepped in – effectively vetoing the process.
In effect, the military remains the real referee of power in Guinea-Bissau because the civilian institutions lack the resilience, legitimacy, and stability to enforce democratic rule.
A major factor behind this chronic instability is the country’s well-documented entanglement with illegal drug trafficking. Since the early 2000s, Guinea-Bissau has become a critical transit hub for cocaine, travelling from Latin America to Europe – a role that has earned it the label of Africa’s “narco-state.”
Over time, powerful networks formed: political elites, military actors, and criminal syndicates intertwined. Former military and navy chiefs have been implicated in trafficking schemes.
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The control of these illicit economies becomes a form of power – and a major incentive for interventions. Analysts of past coups in Guinea-Bissau describe some as “cocaine coups,” where the military sought control over the drug trade routes through the state apparatus.
In the eyes of some soldiers and officers, a transition of power through civilian elections may threaten these shadow-economies; a coup can be seen as a way to preserve their economic interests under the guise of “restoring order.”
The 26 November 2025 takeover in Guinea-Bissau is tragic, but not surprising. It is the inevitable outcome of decades of weakened institutions, chronic corruption, and the infiltration of illicit economies into the core of state power. Unless Guinea-Bissau undertakes deep structural reforms – rebuilding parliamentary and judicial independence; reforming security institutions; rooting out corruption tied to the narcotics trade; and restoring public trust through accountability – the military will continue to see itself as the only guarantor of order.
Thus, every electoral cycle – particularly a contested one – becomes a potential flashpoint: where the risk of meddling, manipulation, and ultimately, military seizure, looms large. The November 26 coup itself was justified by the army on the grounds of “a planned attempt by politicians and a well-known drug lord to manipulate results.”
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The chronic inability of civilian governments to deliver basic services – healthcare, education, infrastructure, jobs – erodes public trust. In a country ranked very low on human development indices, many citizens suffer from poverty, low social mobility, and limited access to justice or economic opportunities.
As a result, a segment of the population may increasingly see the military not as usurpers, but as a “necessary evil” – a force that can step in when politicians fail. The pattern becomes self-reinforcing: weak institutions translated to poor governance, disillusionment and openness to military intervention.
Guinea-Bissau’s crisis is not unique in West Africa. Across the region – in countries facing economic hardship, weak institutions, corruption, and security challenges – coups and military interventions have surged. Many of them follow the same logic: when civilian governments appear unable or unwilling to govern effectively, the military reasserts itself. The 2025 takeover is thus part of a broader pattern, not an isolated breakdown.
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The coup exposes the persistent fragility of civil institutions. It shows that even when elections are held, when both major candidates claim victory, when ballot boxes are opened – none of that ensures transfer of power if institutions lack independence, strength, or legitimacy.
It illustrates how illicit economies undermine democracy. The convergence of political elites, military actors, and drug-trafficking networks create rent-seeking incentives that are incompatible with transparent, accountable governance. As long as illicit economies provide power and wealth, the temptation to revert to force remains high.
It signals a deeper crisis of legitimacy. When citizens lose faith in democratically elected governments to improve lives, when corruption is rampant, and when institutions are hollowed out, the social contract collapses. In such a vacuum, the military, historically institutionally powerful, steps in “to restore order.”
It underscores a regional challenge. For democracy to endure in West Africa, elections are not enough. States need strong institutions, independent judiciaries, accountable civil services, and effective rule of law. Without that, and without tackling systemic corruption and illicit economies, democracy will keep unravelling.
The 26 November 2025 takeover in Guinea-Bissau is tragic, but not surprising. It is the inevitable outcome of decades of weakened institutions, chronic corruption, and the infiltration of illicit economies into the core of state power. Unless Guinea-Bissau undertakes deep structural reforms – rebuilding parliamentary and judicial independence; reforming security institutions; rooting out corruption tied to the narcotics trade; and restoring public trust through accountability – the military will continue to see itself as the only guarantor of order.
Democracy built solely on elections, without institutional depth and social justice, remains a façade – and a fragile one at that.
Comrade Danlami popularly known as Baba Lawan writes from Haliru Umar Street, Dorayi Karamar Unguwar Yamma, Gwale LGA, Kano State, Nigeria. He can be reached via email: lawanmusa363@gmail.com
