BY LANRE OGUNDIPE
THE MOST significant message from the 26 October meeting in Tehran between Iran and senior representatives of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan is not that the United States has lost its influence in the Middle East. It is that regional powers are increasingly exploring security arrangements that do not depend exclusively on Washington.
That distinction matters. American military power remains formidable, its defence relationships across the Gulf remain consequential, and its capacity to influence regional calculations has not disappeared. Yet military superiority does not guarantee diplomatic control. A country can remain the region’s strongest external military power while discovering that other governments are increasingly willing to negotiate, hedge their bets and pursue arrangements beyond its immediate direction.
The first disadvantage for the United States is the possible erosion of its position as the indispensable security interlocutor. When regional governments develop direct channels to adversaries and construct alternative mechanisms for managing crises, Washington risks losing some of its ability to shape negotiations before decisions are made.
The Tehran meeting brought this tension into sharp focus.
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On 7 August, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, committing themselves to collective assistance in the event of an external armed attack against any of the signatories. Less than three months later, representatives of the three countries were engaging Iranian officials in Tehran to discuss regional security and prevent renewed escalation. The four countries agreed to continue discussions on cooperation, peace and security.
This sequence is strategically significant. The Makkah agreement was not officially presented as an anti-Iran alliance. The subsequent Tehran engagement reinforces that distinction. Regional powers are attempting to combine deterrence with diplomacy rather than assume that military alignment must foreclose political accommodation.
For Washington, the implications are consequential.
For decades, American security partnerships, forward-deployed forces, intelligence cooperation and arms supplies have helped shape the strategic calculations of Gulf governments. But the current crisis has exposed a fundamental limitation: even an extensive military presence cannot, by itself, guarantee the security of regional infrastructure, shipping routes and energy facilities during a wider conflict.
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If Gulf governments conclude that their exposure to retaliation remains high despite their security relationships with the United States, they will have stronger incentives to diversify their options. That does not necessarily mean abandoning Washington. It means refusing to make Washington their only option.
The first disadvantage for the United States is the possible erosion of its position as the indispensable security interlocutor. When regional governments develop direct channels to adversaries and construct alternative mechanisms for managing crises, Washington risks losing some of its ability to shape negotiations before decisions are made.
The second concerns the credibility of American security assurances. Weapons sales and military deployments create dependence, but dependence is not the same as confidence. Gulf governments will judge their partnerships not simply by the sophistication of American equipment, but by whether those relationships help protect their populations, energy installations, ports and commercial lifelines when threats become real.
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If that confidence weakens, procurement diversification, domestic defence production and new intelligence arrangements become more attractive. American defence companies could eventually face stronger competition, while Washington could lose some of the political leverage that comes with long-term military integration.
For Washington, the danger is not an empty chair at one meeting. It is the gradual loss of the assumption that no consequential regional security decision can be made without it.
There is also a danger in the emergence of parallel security arrangements. Regional ownership of security is not inherently destabilising. Direct diplomacy may, in fact, reduce the risk of miscalculation. But new agreements will be tested by difficult questions. What constitutes an attack? What response is required? How will members reconcile conflicting interests? Can a collective-defence commitment survive a crisis in which one signatory wishes to retaliate while another prefers restraint?
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These are not minor details. They will determine whether such agreements become credible instruments of deterrence or additional sources of uncertainty.
Nor should the diplomatic opening be mistaken for an automatic transfer of influence to China or Russia. Both have economic and strategic interests in the region and may benefit from a more competitive diplomatic environment. But neither can simply replace the full range of American military, intelligence and defence-industrial relationships. The more immediate development is that regional governments have greater reason to bargain among competing partners rather than depend on a single external power.
The economic stakes are considerable. The Strait of Hormuz remains vital to international energy supplies, while threats to shipping and critical infrastructure can raise insurance costs, disrupt exports and increase price volatility. A more inclusive regional security arrangement could help reduce these risks. A fragmented system of competing commitments could make them worse.
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There is, however, an important qualification. The United States was not a participant in the Tehran meeting, but its absence from that gathering does not establish that it has been excluded from regional diplomacy. Parallel mediation efforts involving Qatar have continued in coordination with Washington. The proper question is not whether America has suddenly disappeared from the Middle East, but whether it can retain its influence as regional actors pursue greater freedom of strategic choice.
That is the real test of American primacy. It will not be measured solely by the number of troops deployed, weapons supplied or bases maintained. It will also be measured by whether regional governments continue to regard Washington as an essential partner in shaping the terms of their security.
The emerging lesson is not that the Gulf has moved beyond America. It is that Gulf governments increasingly want room to negotiate with America without having to negotiate only through America.
For Washington, the danger is not an empty chair at one meeting. It is the gradual loss of the assumption that no consequential regional security decision can be made without it.
